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Iranian Journal of Fuzzy Systems، جلد ۸، شماره ۴، صفحات ۱۰۷-۱۱۷
عنوان فارسی COALITIONAL GAME WITH FUZZY PAYOFFS AND CREDIBILISTIC SHAPLEY VALUE
چکیده فارسی مقاله Coalitional game deals with situations that involve cooperations among players, and there are different solution concepts such as the core,
the Shapley value and the kernel. In many situations, there is no way to predict the payoff functions except for the expert experiences
and subjective intuitions, which leads to the coalitional game with fuzzy payoffs. Within the framework of credibility theory, this paper employs
two credibilistic approaches to define the behaviors of players under fuzzy situations. Correspondingly, two variations of Shapley value are
proposed as the solutions of the coalitional game with fuzzy payoffs. Meanwhile, some characterizations of the credibilistic Shapley value
are investigated. Finally, an example is provided for illustrating the usefulness of the theory developed in this paper.
کلیدواژه‌های فارسی مقاله Coalitional game، Shapley value، Fuzzy variable، Credibility measure،
عنوان انگلیسی COALITIONAL GAME WITH FUZZY PAYOFFS AND CREDIBILISTIC SHAPLEY VALUE
چکیده انگلیسی مقاله Coalitional game deals with situations that involve cooperations among players, and there are different solution concepts such as the core,
the Shapley value and the kernel. In many situations, there is no way to predict the payoff functions except for the expert experiences
and subjective intuitions, which leads to the coalitional game with fuzzy payoffs. Within the framework of credibility theory, this paper employs
two credibilistic approaches to define the behaviors of players under fuzzy situations. Correspondingly, two variations of Shapley value are
proposed as the solutions of the coalitional game with fuzzy payoffs. Meanwhile, some characterizations of the credibilistic Shapley value
are investigated. Finally, an example is provided for illustrating the usefulness of the theory developed in this paper.
کلیدواژه‌های انگلیسی مقاله Coalitional game, Shapley value, Fuzzy variable, Credibility measure
نویسندگان مقاله Jinwu Gao |
Uncertain Systems Lab, School of Information, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China

Q. Zhang |
Uncertain Systems Lab, School of Information, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China

P. Shen |
Uncertain Systems Lab, School of Information, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China

نشانی اینترنتی http://ijfs.usb.ac.ir/article_311_ec8eadf2c503f1494486ac8555956b9a.pdf
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