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جستجوی مقالات
پنجشنبه 27 آذر 1404
پژوهش های فلسفی – کلامی
، جلد ۲۵، شماره ۳، صفحات ۱۰۱-۱۱۸
عنوان فارسی
Haji and the Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Will
چکیده فارسی مقاله
In recent work, I defend an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. (Lemos, 2018, Ch. 5; 2021; 2023, Ch. 6). On this view, basic free-willed actions are understood as the result of causally indeterminate deliberative processes in which the agent assigns evaluative weight to the reasons for the different choice options under consideration. In basic free-willed actions, the assignment of weights is causally undetermined, and the choices are typically the causal consequence of these assignments of weights in which the choice option that is more highly valued is the choice option selected. In a recent article, Ishtiyaque Haji (2022) criticizes my view, arguing that it: (a) does not resolve worries about luck and (b) does not make coherent sense of the freedom of the weightings involved in free choices. I argue that his criticisms are based on misunderstandings of my position.
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عنوان انگلیسی
Haji and the Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Will
چکیده انگلیسی مقاله
In recent work, I defend an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. (Lemos, 2018, Ch. 5; 2021; 2023, Ch. 6). On this view, basic free-willed actions are understood as the result of causally indeterminate deliberative processes in which the agent assigns evaluative weight to the reasons for the different choice options under consideration. In basic free-willed actions, the assignment of weights is causally undetermined, and the choices are typically the causal consequence of these assignments of weights in which the choice option that is more highly valued is the choice option selected. In a recent article, Ishtiyaque Haji (2022) criticizes my view, arguing that it: (a) does not resolve worries about luck and (b) does not make coherent sense of the freedom of the weightings involved in free choices. I argue that his criticisms are based on misunderstandings of my position.
کلیدواژههای انگلیسی مقاله
free will, libertarianism, Indeterministic weightings, luck, John Lemos, Isthtiyaque Haji
نویسندگان مقاله
John Lemos |
Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Coe College, USA
نشانی اینترنتی
https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2499_0826d79aa9c8e09bfce78ed547cf51df.pdf
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