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جستجوی مقالات
سه شنبه 25 آذر 1404
پژوهش های فلسفی – کلامی
، جلد ۲۶، شماره ۱، صفحات ۲۰-۵
عنوان فارسی
Consciousness, Subjective Facts, and Physicalism – Fifty Years since Nagel’s Bat
چکیده فارسی مقاله
The existence of subjective facts in the epistemic sense defined by Thomas Nagel’s famous article, “What is it like to be a bat?” might be taken to support an anti-physicalist conclusion. I argue that it does not. The combination of nonreductive physicalism and teleo-pragmatic functionalism is not only consistent with such subjective facts but predicts their existence. The notion that conscious minds are self-understanding autopoietic systems plays a key role in the argument. Global Neuronal Workspace Theory is assessed in terms of its potential to answer David Chalmers’ Hard Problem of consciousness. A suggestion is made for augmenting the theory that involves another sense in which facts about conscious experience are subjective. The idea of conscious minds as self-understanding systems again plays an important role.
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عنوان انگلیسی
Consciousness, subjective facts and physicalism – 50 years since Nagel’s bat.
چکیده انگلیسی مقاله
The existence of subjective facts in the epistemic sense defined by Thomas Nagel’s famous article, “What is like to be a bat?”, might be taken to support an anti-physicalist conclusion. I argue that it does not. The combination of nonreductive physicalism and teleo-pragmatic functionalism is not only consistent with such subjective facts but predicts their existence. The notion that conscious minds are self-understanding autopoietic systems plays a key role in the argument. Global Neuronal Workspace theory is assessed in terms of its potential to answer David Chalmers’ Hard Problem of consciousness. A suggestion is made for augmenting the theory that involves another sense in which facts about conscious experience are subjective. The idea of conscious minds as self-understanding systems again plays an important role.A suggestion is made for augmenting the theory that involves another sense in which facts about conscious experience are subjective. The idea of conscious minds as self-understanding systems again plays an important role.
کلیدواژههای انگلیسی مقاله
consciousness, subjective facts, physicalism, self-understanding
نویسندگان مقاله
Robert Van Gulick |
Professor, Philosophy Department, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, US.
نشانی اینترنتی
https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2877_385a85fa06b27c30ee8731f7a365cab7.pdf
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