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جستجوی مقالات
سه شنبه 25 آذر 1404
پژوهش های فلسفی – کلامی
، جلد ۲۶، شماره ۳، صفحات ۱۵۱-۱۷۴
عنوان فارسی
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on “Conception” and “Assent”
چکیده فارسی مقاله
According to the orthodox view in Aristotelian tradition concerning the division of knowledge (
ʿilm
), some knowledge in the form of conception (
taṣawwur
) and assent (
taṣdīq
) is attainable (
al-ʿilm
al-ḥuṣūlī
). The attainable knowledge is divided into primitive and theoretical. Regarding primitive knowledge, concerning “the conception”, knowing the language and noticing the word is enough to understand it without asking anyone,
and concerning “the assent”, the assertion of which its ingredients are already known
is primitive and hence non-acquisitive if the knower immediately and without any investigation finds its truth-value. On the other hand, acquisitive knowledge is the knowledge about which the above conditions are not enough and the thinker should make some effort to obtain it, hence it is theoretical. However, according to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, a famous Muslim philosopher, logician, and theologian, all “concepts” and all “assents”, are non-acquisitive although they may be divided into primitive and theoretical. His view leads to the conclusion that all sciences are non-acquisitive, that is, mankind does not have the power to acquire them, which is a counterintuitive view. Ṭūsī is the most famous critic of Rāzī. In this paper, first, I have examined Rāzī’s views and arguments and Ṭūsī’s criticisms. Secondly, I have suggested that Rāzī’s view is rooted in his theological viewpoint, which is coherent with Ashʿarite doctrine.
کلیدواژههای فارسی مقاله
عنوان انگلیسی
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the non-acquisitiveness of “Conceptions” and “Assents”
چکیده انگلیسی مقاله
According to the orthodox view in Aristotelian tradition concerning the division of knowledge (ʿilm), some knowledge in the form of conception (taṣawwur) and assent (taṣdīq) is attainable (al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī). The attainable knowledge is divided into primitive and theoretical. Regarding primitive knowledge, concerning “the conception”, knowing the language and noticing the word is enough to understand it without asking anyone and concerning “the assent”, the assertion of which its ingredients are already known is primitive and hence non-acquisitive if the knower immediately without any investigation finds its truth-value. On the other hand, acquisitive knowledge is the knowledge about which the above conditions are not enough and the thinker should make some effort to obtain it, hence it is theoretical. However, according to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, all “conceptions” and all “assents”, are non-acquisitive although they may be divided into primitive and theoretical. His view leads to the conclusion that all sciences are non-acquisitive. Ṭūsī is the most famous critic of Rāzī. In this paper, first, I have examined Rāzī’s views and arguments and Ṭūsī’s criticisms. Secondly, I have suggested that Rāzī’s view is rooted in his theological viewpoint, which is coherent with Ashʿarite doctrine.
کلیدواژههای انگلیسی مقاله
Fakhr al- Rāzī, Ṭūsī, conception, assent, non-acquisitive knowledge, Ashʿarite
نویسندگان مقاله
Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati |
Professor, Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
نشانی اینترنتی
https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3023_70011363bbbc82798400df8a388044cf.pdf
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