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تحقیقات بازاریابی نوین، جلد ۳، شماره ۵، صفحات ۱۲۵-۱۳۸
عنوان فارسی A Comparative Study of Multi-Attribute Continuous Double Auction Mechanisms
چکیده فارسی مقاله Auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. Single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. Double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single-sided and single-attribute auctions. Nonetheless, this adds the complexity of the auction. Any auction mechanism needs to be budget balanced, Pareto optimal, individually rational, and coalition-proof. Satisfying all these properties is not so much trivial so that no multi-attribute double auction mechanism could address all these limitations. This research analyzes and compares the GM, timestamp-based and social-welfare maximization mechanisms for multi-attribute double auctions. The analysis of the simulation results shows that the algorithm proposed by Gimple and Makio satisfies more properties compared to other methods for such an auction mechanism. This multi-attribute double auction mechanism is based on game theory and behaves fairer in matching and arbitration.
کلیدواژه‌های فارسی مقاله Double auction، Multi-attribute auction، Continuous multi-attribute double auction، Multi، attribute auction، Coalition-proofness، Continuous multi، attribute double auction، Coalition، proofness،
عنوان انگلیسی A Comparative Study of Multi-Attribute Continuous Double Auction Mechanisms
چکیده انگلیسی مقاله Auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. Single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. Double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single-sided and single-attribute auctions. Nonetheless, this adds the complexity of the auction. Any auction mechanism needs to be budget balanced, Pareto optimal, individually rational, and coalition-proof. Satisfying all these properties is not so much trivial so that no multi-attribute double auction mechanism could address all these limitations. This research analyzes and compares the GM, timestamp-based and social-welfare maximization mechanisms for multi-attribute double auctions. The analysis of the simulation results shows that the algorithm proposed by Gimple and Makio satisfies more properties compared to other methods for such an auction mechanism. This multi-attribute double auction mechanism is based on game theory and behaves fairer in matching and arbitration.
کلیدواژه‌های انگلیسی مقاله Double auction, Multi-attribute auction, Continuous multi-attribute double auction, Multi, attribute auction, Coalition-proofness, Continuous multi, attribute double auction, Coalition, proofness
نویسندگان مقاله سیمین نقوی |


یاسمن سرلتی |


فریبا نصیری مفخم | nassiri mofakham


نشانی اینترنتی http://nmrj.ui.ac.ir/article_17727_38cab1352af21ebbdfaf401d1160662e.pdf
فایل مقاله اشکال در دسترسی به فایل - ./files/site1/rds_journals/690/article-690-336836.pdf
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